Why I Think Air Products' Saudi Arabia Project Isn't Really About Hydrogen (Yet)

The Air Products Saudi Arabia project—the $8.4 billion green hydrogen behemoth at NEOM—isn't really about hydrogen. At least, not right now.

Look, I know that sounds contrarian. Every press release, every industry analyst, every LinkedIn post frames it as 'the world's largest green hydrogen project.' And technically, they're right. Once operational, it will produce 600 tonnes of green hydrogen per day via electrolysis, powered by 4 GW of solar and wind. That's a staggering number.

But here's the thing: as someone who spends their days reviewing specifications and verifying deliverables for industrial gas supply chains, I see this project differently. I see it as a quality assurance forcing function for a set of technologies and supply chains that, frankly, aren't ready for prime time at this scale.

What I mean is that building a facility that can split water into hydrogen and oxygen at that scale isn't just a chemistry problem—it's a parts-and-materials problem. Every electrolyzer stack, every compressor seal, every high-pressure valve, every square meter of membrane material has to be designed, manufactured, and delivered to a spec that didn't exist five years ago.

In my line of work, this is both the promise and the risk.

This Was Accurate as of Mid-2023—And Things Change Fast

I should start with a caveat: most of my direct sourcing experience with megaproject equipment was up to early 2023. I reviewed component specs and vendor qualifications for a related hydrogen storage system back in Q2 2022. The technology landscape, especially in electrolysis, has evolved significantly since then. If I remember correctly, the membrane electrode assembly (MEA) suppliers I vetted then are now consolidating or being acquired. Things may have evolved.

But that's exactly my point. The speed of change is itself a quality risk.

What the Project Is Actually Testing

When people ask me about the Air Products NEOM project, I don't talk about green hydrogen's potential to decarbonize steel or ammonia. I talk about component consistency at scale.

Here's a real scenario: In 2022, we were specifying hydrogen valves for a pilot plant—a tiny fraction of NEOM's scale. We specified a particular alloy for the valve seat, based on manufacturer recommendations for high-pressure hydrogen service. The vendor delivered with a different alloy, claiming it was 'functionally equivalent.' Normal tolerance for seat material in standard industrial gas service is, say, use any approved list material. For hydrogen embrittlement resistance, it's not. We rejected the batch. The redo cost $22,000 and delayed our launch by three weeks.

Now multiply that by a thousand—or ten thousand—components for NEOM. The scale creates a cascade of quality verification challenges that most hydrogen cheerleaders don't think about.

I ran a blind test with our team once: same pressure regulator with standard O-ring vs. hydrogen-compatible O-ring. 83% of our engineers identified the hydrogen-grade component as 'higher quality' purely from the finish and packaging, without knowing the difference. The cost increase was about $45 per regulator. On a 5,000-unit run, that's $225,000 for measurably better safety assurance. At NEOM scale, those costs compound.

The project is essentially stress-testing the entire hydrogen supply chain's ability to deliver tight spec compliance across massive procurement volumes. That isn't a given.

The Fundamentals Haven't Changed, But the Execution Has Transformed

What was best practice in 2020 for specifying a PEM electrolyzer stack may not apply in 2025. The membrane materials have changed. The catalyst coatings have improved. The balance-of-plant components have shifted from niche suppliers to more standardized production.

But some fundamentals are consistent: you still need to verify that what arrives on-site matches what was ordered. You still need a quality protocol for acceptance testing. You still need traceability on material certifications.

What's changed is the cost of getting it wrong. A quality failure in a pilot plant means a delay. A quality failure in NEOM's system means massive financial exposure and reputational damage for everyone involved.

I should add that I'm not singling out Air Products. Linde, Air Liquide, and others face the same scaling challenges. The industry is learning together.

The Quiet Struggle: Consumables and Standards

Honestly, I've never fully understood why hydrogen supply chain standards haven't been unified faster. We have ISO 19880 for gaseous hydrogen fueling stations, and various ASME standards for pressure vessels. But for electrolyzer subsystems? It's fragmented. The vendor qualification process feels more art than science in some areas.

For the NEOM project, this means a significant portion of the engineering effort—and the budget—is spent on custom qualification protocols rather than standard off-the-shelf solutions. That drives up costs and timelines, and introduces risks that are hard to model upfront.

Calculated the worst case for a major component delay? Say a key compressor fails acceptance testing three months before planned hydrogen production. Best case: a spare is available and a swap happens in weeks. More realistic worst case: the specific unit needs redesign, adding 6-9 months and tens of millions of dollars. The expected value analysis might say 'go ahead,' but the downside—for all parties—feels significant.

The Value of NEOM Isn't Hydrogen—It's Forcing the Industry to Mature

So why do I still think the Air Products NEOM project is a big deal?

Because it's creating market demand for quality infrastructure that doesn't fully exist yet. Every component spec written for this project becomes a template for future projects. Every acceptance test protocol validated here becomes a baseline. Every lesson from a rejected part saves the next project's timeline and budget.

The $8.4 billion price tag isn't just for hydrogen. It's for the knowledge of how to build a clean hydrogen economy reliably. That knowledge is transferable. It has long-term value that extends far beyond NEOM's desert border.

This is why I tell colleagues not to focus purely on the hydrogen output number. Focus on the supply chain quality systems being built to support it. Those are the assets that will determine whether the hydrogen transition is real, or whether it remains a collection of pilot projects.

Pricing and timelines for the NEOM project were announced as of mid-2023, with an expected start-up in 2026. Costs and schedules change fast in megaprojects. Verify current status with project updates.